Louisiana Law Review
Volume 36 | Number 4
Summer 1976

The Attorney and Contempt: How Can He Advise
His Client?
Kathleen A. Manning

Repository Citation
Kathleen A. Manning, The Attorney and Contempt: How Can He Advise His Client?, 36 La. L. Rev. (1976)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol36/iss4/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

1976]

NOTES

1057

The state legislature certainly has authority to provide
for a "first appearance" hearing to supplement the present
procedure outlined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 51 However, until such action is taken by the legislature, Louisiana
courts should enforce the present statutory scheme, recently
constitutionally reaffirmed. 52 Since a writ denial is not a ruling on the matter, when the issue is again presented, hopefully the Louisiana Supreme Court will clarify a criminal
defendant's rights by recognizing that only competent evidence should be admissible at a preliminary examination in
Louisiana.
Pete Lewis

THE ATTORNEY AND CONTEMPT:

How CAN HE ADVISE HIS

CLIENT?

In Maness v. Meyers,' the United States Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether an attorney can, without
risking a contempt citation, advise his client to disobey a
court's order to produce evidence, when the attorney's advice
is based on his good faith belief that the client is protected by
the fifth amendment from disclosure of that evidence. The
attorney's client had been served, during a civil trial, 2 with a
not except in rare instances be held soon enough to satisfy the promptness
required by Gerstein, due to the need to allow the defendant time to procure
counsel and time to prepare for the hearing. The court in Gerstein recognized
that the more extensive the procedure was, the more difficult it would be to
comply with the decision and suggested that some existing procedures would
have to be accelerated and others modified. '120 U.S. at 120, 124.
51. At present the Louisiana State Law Institute has under study a
proposal that would allow the finding of probable cause to be based in whole
or in part on hearsay (proposed art. 299) with a corollary amendment to art.
295 that would permit a motion to strike prior recorded hearsay testimony
when the transcript is to be introduced at trial. This would be an attempt to
legislatively effectuate our present statutory scheme into a Gerstein type
hearing; however, it would constitute a major departure from the redactors'
intended meaning of LA. CONST. art. I, § 14, and would not solve the problems
in trying to combine the two proceedings.
52. See authorities in note 38, supra.
1. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
2. Although the trial was referred to as a civil one, the proceeding was
criminal in nature since it was initiated under Article 527 of the Texas Penal
Code, which regulates the distribution of obscene materials. The article pro-
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subpoena duces tecum requiring production of several allegedly obscene magazines he was distributing. Urging that
the magazines were privileged under the fifth amendment,
the defendant filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which the
trial judge denied. Believing that the materials would tend to
incriminate his client and that the safeguards to prevent
their future use in a criminal prosecution were inadequate, 3
the attorney advised his client to refuse to produce the evidence. 4 The trial judge, believing that the court could rule
properly on the admissibility of the evidence only if the subpoena were obeyed, held both the attorney and his client in
contempt. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held that when an attorney's client is ordered to produce
information, the attorney is not subject to a contempt citation
for advising his client, in good faith, to assert his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination by refusing
to produce it. 5 Only the client can actually comply or disobey,
the Court observed, so only he should be required to accept
the consequences of his choice. To make his choice meaningful, a laymen must be informed of his legal rights and obligations and of the possible risks he faces;6 if the legal system is
structured so that an attorney risks a jail sentence or fine for
vided a procedure by which the district attorney could seek to enjoin the
distribution through civil proceedings. Id. at 450-51 n.1.
3. The client had previously been convicted of a criminal charge based on
distribution of magazines similar to those demanded by the subpoena, and
his attorney recognized the difficulty of "unringing the bell" once they were
produced even if they were not actually introduced into evidence at the
injunction hearing. Id. at 451-52.
4. The attorney merely advised his client to refuse production of the
magazine; the choice between complying and disobeying remained, quite
properly, entirely with the witness. Id. at 455. The issue of the attorney's
guilt of the contempt charge may have been decided quite differently had he
actually instructed his client to disobey.
5. Id. at 468.
6. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Blackmun,
expressed the view that the majority's rationale implies that counsel must be
available to every witness in any proceeding in which his testimony may be
compelled so that his fifth amendment privilege will not be infringed. These
justices were not willing to go so far towards recognizing an unqualified right
to appointed counsel in civil proceedings. Id. at 471. Chief Justice Burger,
speaking for the majority, saw no reason to extend the rationale beyond the
facts of this case in which the contempt sanction was interfering with the
ability of retained counsel to aid his client in effectively implementing the
privilege. Id. at 466 n.15.
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giving such potentially vital advice, he may be inclined to
7
withhold it from his client.
Upon accepting a position as counsel, an attorney becomes trustee for his client's interests and is bound ethically
by the canons of his profession to represent that client "zealously within the bounds of the law."8 Ideally an attorney
should be free to advise his client of all his rights and of all
legal alternatives available to him. An attorney'g advice cannot be completely unfettered, however, since he is also responsible to the judicial system. 9 When an attorney counsels
his client to ignore a court order, and disregarding the order
is not necessary to protect his client's interests, the attorney
may be subject to a citation for contempt of court. 10 Presumably, citing an attorney for contempt in these circumstances
rarely will be necessary, and even then only to vindicate the
dignity of the court whose rulings have been disregarded,"
since the responsibilities imposed by the ethical canons may
be enforced internally by appropriate disciplinary action
when necessary. 2 When an attorney's client faces a court
order upholding a subpoena duces tecum or directly commanding him to answer despite his attorney's objections and
the information sought is potentially incriminating or otherwise privileged,' 3 the client unquestionably requires profes7. Id. at 466.
8. LOUISIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 (found
in ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N art. LA.
R.S. 37, ch. 4, app.) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]. For more specific limitations on representation within the bounds
of law, see CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102. This rule
provides in part that "in his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: ...
Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." Id.
9. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-106(A): "A lawyer shall
not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or
a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he may take
appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such a rule or ruling."
10. See In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); In re Portland Elec. Power Co., 97
F. Supp. 903 (D. Oregon, 1947); 18 U.S.C. 401 (1948). See generally LA. CODE
CIV. P. arts. 221-22, 224; LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 20-21, 23.
11. "[O]nce the court has ruled, counsel and others involved in the action
must abide by the ruling and comply with the court's orders." 419 U.S. at 459
(emphasis supplied).
12. See generally ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR
AsS'N LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, app. Art. XV, on the discipline and disbarment of
members.
13. Important privileges include, for example, the privilege against self-
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sional assistance. The practical problem for the attorney is
determining what advice he may offer without transgressing
14
the limits of professional responsibility and the law.
To insure an efficient judicial system, court orders, rules,
commands, and decrees must be obeyed strictly by those to
whom they are addressed. Recognizing this need, the United
States Supreme Court, in Elliott v. Peirsol,15 early stated
what has now become a basic rule of law:
Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide
every question which occurs in the cause; and whether its
decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other Court. But,
if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are
16
regarded as nullities.
Orders issued by a court without subject matter or personal
jurisdiction may be disregarded without liability to process
for contempt. 17 If a court has jurisdiction, 8 however, its orincrimination [U.S. CONST. amend. V; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16] and the statutory and common law privileges of attorney-client [LA. R.S. 15:475 (1950); LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2283], doctor-patient [LA. R.S. 15:476 (1950); LA. R.S. 13:3734
(Supp. 1968)], and husband-wife [LA. R.S. 15:461 (1950)]. See also FED. R.
EVID. 501.

14. The attorney's communications to his client may take any one of a
variety of forms. He may merely inform the client of the existence of the
privilege against self-incrimination; in this case he has told his client no more
than a copy of the Constitution would have, so he is surely not interfering
with the judicial process. He may also express his opinion that the evidence
sought from his client will have an incriminating effect; there is no interference here either. The attorney in Maness advised his client to take the fifth
amendment and to refuse to disclose the evidence, and the Court supported
his action as proper to protect his client. An attorney cannot instruct his
client to act; the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-8, requires that
the attorney allow his client to make his own decisions on matters which
require choices of alternatives with full information as to the "relevant
considerations."
15. 26 U.S. (1 Peters) 328 (1828).
16. Id. at 340. Later cases affirm this view. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. U.M.W., 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Howat
v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922); Yanish v. Barber, 211 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1954);
Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
17. In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Ex
Parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1881); United States v. Thompson, 319 F.2d 665
(2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 142 F. 176 (W.D.
Mo. 1905). The principle is also accepted in Louisiana. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Fowler v. Rost, 50 La. Ann. 1006, 24 So. 783 (1898); State ex rel. City of New
Orleans v. Theard, 48 La. Ann. 1448, 21 So. 28 (1896).
18. A court is sometimes said to have jurisdiction to determine whether
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ders must be obeyed until they are overturned through
proper utilization of judicial procedures. An order compelling
testimony or production of documents is not a final judgment
and so usually is not appealable. 19 But such an order can
cause irreparable injury, since compliance with the order may
20
release information that cannot be recalled into secrecy.
Thus initial obedience with review on appeal is often an insufficient solution, as is the frequently suggested alternative
of disobedience with review of the order in a subsequent con21
tempt proceeding which may lead to a fine or jail sentence.
To mitigate the harshness of the prohibition against interlocutory appeals, the federal courts have made immediate
appeals available in exceptional cases, 22 especially when the
recipient of the order is not a party to the principal action and
could not participate in a later appeal of the entire case. 23 In
or not it has jurisdiction, so that early orders issued to maintain the status
quo may support contempt charges even if the court later decides it has no
power to decide the main cause of action. United States v. U.M.W., 330 U.S.
258, 291-92 (1947); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).
19. Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906); Stull v. Rosenfield's
House of Fashion, Inc., 220 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1958); LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1841, 2083.
20. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); United States v. Dickinson, 465
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); Harper & Row Pub'rs, Inc., v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487
(7th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
21. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).
22. Federal practice allows appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958) when
an order not otherwise appealable "involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and an immediate appeal would substantially advance the litigation. Groover, Christie
& Merritt'v. LoBianco, 336 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964).
23. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918) (appeal allowed since
otherwise recipient Would be powerless to avert the mischief of the order);
Cates v. LTV Aerospace, 480 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1973) (discovery order appealable when government is not a party and asserts executive privilege); Carr v.
Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971)
(government, a non-party, asserted its privilege against disclosure of adminstrative records; court specified that denial of privilege to parties was not
appealable absent a final judgment or a finding of contempt); Covey Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964
(1965) (subpoena requested trade secrets from non-party, denial of motion to
quash was appealable). These exceptions are narrowly drawn, however,
because of the strong federal interest in preventing the delays associated
with piecemeal appeals. See, e.g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124
(1962); Note, The Final Judgment Rule in the Federal Courts, 47 COLUM. L.

1062

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Louisiana, however, interlocutory judgments determining
"preliminary matters in the course of an action" are appeala'24
ble when they "may cause irreparable injury.
When appeal is unavailable, the lawyer who believes that
a client faced with such an order has a valid claim of privilege
can seek immediate review of the claim through an application for a writ of mandamus 25 directing the trial court to
modify or rescind its order. Because such a writ is not a
substitute for an appeal but rather is an extraordinary remedy 26 for cases in which irreparable injury 27 might result
from delaying review, mandamus will issue in federal court
only after all possible steps have been taken in the trial court
to obtain a protective order 28 and appeal is shown to be an
inadequate remedy. 29 In Louisiana the courts of appeal and
REV. 239 (1947); Note, Proposalsfor Interlocutory Appeals, 58 YALE L.J. 1186
(1949).
24. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1841 and 2083. Whether the plaintiff can establish the requisite irreparable injury is a question of proof. Costello v. Southern Pub. Co., Inc., 140 La. 161, 72 So. 910 (1916) (refusal of court to recall
subpoena duces tecum was an interlocutory judgment not resulting in irreparable injury so no appeal would lie); Anderson v. Southern Consumers
Educ. Foundation, Inc., 196 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (judgment
directing party to answer interrogatories and pay attorney's fees was not a
final judgment and caused no irreparable injury so was not appealable).
Louisiana courts have also held that no irreparable injury exists when
supervisory jurisdiction can be invoked. Bonck v. Plimsoll Club, Inc., 254 So.
2d 310 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Stull v. Rosenfield's House of Fashion, Inc.,
220 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1949); Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus
under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595 (1973); Note, Federal Court
Review by ExtraordinaryWrit: A Clogged Safety Valve in the Final Judgment
Rule, 63 YALE L.J. 105 (1953). In Louisiana, this writ is one of those obtainable by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction granted to the Louisiana Supreme Court [LA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (a)] and the courts of appeal [LA. CONST.
art. V, § 10(a)].
26. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956); Ex Parte Fahey, 332
U.S. 258, 260 (1947); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d 402, 409-10 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27. Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Court, 287 F.2d 324, 328 (9th
Cir. 1961) (mandamus issued to prevent unnecessary disclosure of trade formulas and testing procedures). Contra, City of Los Angeles v. Williams, 438
F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1971) (a claim of privilege enjoys no special status in
considering petition for extraordinary writ).
28. Southern Calif. Theater Owners Ass'n v. United States District
Court, 430 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1970) (claim of attorney-client privilege, application -for mandamus held premature).
29. Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d 402, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (no writ issues-
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the supreme court will exercise supervisory jurisdiction 3
only in cases in which no other remedy is adequate to prevent
great injury. 3 1 More importantly, the initial decision whether
to stay the proceedings in the trial court pending a ruling on
the application for supervisory writs is within the trial
judge's discretion. 32 Unless the higher court orders a stay, 33 a
trial judge may proceed, 34 perhaps invoking his contempt
remedy on appeal is adequate); Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th
Cir. 1973) (claim of journalist's privilege rejected-no showing of extraordinary circumstances); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 1972)
(claim of attorney-client privilege); Harper & Row Pub'rs, Inc. v. Decker, 423
F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)
(claim of attorney-client privilege); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District
Court, 287 F.2d 324, 328-30 (9th Cir. 1969) (trade secrets).
30. For a specific discussion of the supervisory jurisdiction of Louisiana
courts, see Tate, Supervisory Powers of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, 38

TUL. L. REV. 429 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Tate]; Comment, Supervisory
Powers of the Supreme Court of Louisiana over Inferior Courts, 34 TUL. L.
REV. 165 (1959).

31. In re Louisiana Coastal Lands, 197 La. 701, 711, 2 So. 2d 184, 188
(1941) (writs granted to review subpoena duces tecum which required production of all of a corporation's books); Item Co. v. Nu-Grape Bottling Co. Inc., 160
La. 631, 634-35, 107 So. 471, 472 (1926) (lower court ordered seized property
turned over to a receiver, review granted); Batson v. Time, Inc., 298 So. 2d
100, 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 299 So. 2d 803 (1974) (motion for
summary judgment in libel suit denied, writs granted for review); Brown v.
Brown, 185 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) (delaying review of a trial
court's ruling on admissibility of evidence until judgment and appeal involved no irreparable injury); Diez v. Christian, 169 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1964) (where relief available under supervisory writs is identical to relief
available on appeal, writs will be denied); Graves v. Graves, 122 So. 2d 350
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (welfare of minors in custody case at issue, father
subject to Air Force transfer at any time-review granted). Justice Tate
suggests three classes of cases in which writs are granted: (1) where a
non-appealable trial ruling is erroneous and is substantially prejudicial because of a delay or change in the factual status quo that will result before
appellate review, if any, is available; (2) where the trial court action involves
a clear failure to follow non-discretionary law; and (3) where appeal, though
allowed by law, is an ineffectual or inadequate remedy because of delay
inherent in the ordinary appellate process or because the factual status quo
may change to the irreparable injury of the relator before he can obtain
review by appeal. Tate at 444-46 and cases cited therein.
32. Roumain v. Moody, 225 La. 187, 72 So. 2d 473 (1954); Vincent v. Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
33. When the client is on the witness stand facing an order to answer
immediately and the trial court refuses a stay, there is no time to request a
stay from the higher court; the client must choose immediately whether to
obey the order, o*r refuse and become subject to a citation for contempt.
34. Tate at 434-35.
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power to enforce the challenged order. Should the writ application be dismissed, a contempt citation may be the only
35
avenue of review.
By obtaining interlocutory appellate review or a stay of
the trial proceedings and invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of a higher court, an attorney whose client has been
commanded to produce evidence asserts his client's interest
in a manner consistent with the orderly administration of the
judicial system. 3 6 By counselling disobedience to the order
before exhausting these remedies, an attorney is advising his
client to impede the judicial process deliberately and perhaps
unnecessarily;3 7 on any strict reading of the statutory definitions of contempt the attorney as well as the client is guilty.3 8
Given the strong policy favoring orderly processes, 39 the at35. In Louisiana, contempt findings are also reviewed on supervisory
writs, but such review is limited to an inquiry into the lower court's jurisdiction and the legality and regularity of the contempt proceedings. Gautreau v.
Gautreau, 225 La. 254, 72 So. 2d 497 (1954); Pizzolato v. Cataldo, 202 La. 675, 12
So. 2d 677 (1943); State ex rel. Connerly v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 9 So.
2d 826 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 202 La. 1052, 13 So. 2d
346 (1943); Dabezies v. Bourg, 273 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
36. Provoking contempt in Louisiana is not an effective means of obtaining precompliance review of the order since review of the contempt citation is
limited to jurisdiction and procedure. See note 35, supra and cases cited
therein.
37. "[Qlnce the court has ruled, counsel and others involved in the action
must abide by the ruling and comply with the court's orders. While claims of
error may be preserved in whatever way the applicable rules provide, counsel
should neither engage the court in extended discussion once a ruling is made,
nor advise a client not to comply." 419 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added). This

result is dictated by. what the Court identified as the need for "orderly processes ... imperative to the operation of the adversary system of justice." Id. at

460.
38. See statutes cited in note 10, supra.
39. If the punishment is designed to vindicate the authority of the court
(if the contempt is criminal) the court is entitled to allow the punishment to
stand so that its authority will be upheld. When an order is found invalid, the
case is usually remanded so that the lower court may decide whether it would
have punished the disobedience had it known the order was invalid. Donovan
v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418 (1911); Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14 (1887); United States v.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hammond, 419 F.2d
166 (4th Cir. 1969); Dunn v. United States, 388 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1968);
Western Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Gotfried, 136 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1943). If the
contempt is civil, however, in that the punishment imposed is coercive rather
than punitive in character (as are most contempts based on refusals to
comply with production orders), the contempt charge falls with the order on
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torney who advises his client to disobey an order without first
having utilized the available orderly processes might be held
in contempt of court.
In Maness the Supreme Court approved the procedure of
provoking a contempt citation to obtain precompliance review of an order to produce information. 40 The Court did not
even discuss whether alternative means for obtaining pre41
compliance review were open to an attorney and his client.
In addition to precompliance review, there may also have
been other safeguards available to protect the rights of the
client in Maness, such as a motion to suppress the evidence in
the event the state attempted to use it against the client in a
42
subsequent criminal prosecution.
Although the Court in Maness carefully limited its holding to cases in which a client claims a fifth amendment
privilege, 43 disclosure of information not constitutionally but
otherwise privileged can similarly cause irreparable injury."
which it was based. United States v. U.M.W., 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Cliett v.
Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962); Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank
Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1936).
40. The Court approves the procedure utilized in United States v. Ryan,
402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971), for obtaining review by invoking contempt proceedings. 419 U.S. at 461.
41. Texas, the state in which the Maness case arose, has a final judgment
rule precluding appeals from interlocutory orders, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art.
2249 (1964), but its procedure does allow for the issuance of writs of mandamus, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1733 (1962) (Supreme Court) and art. 1823
(1964) (Courts of Civil Appeals). Mandamus will issue when appeal will not
provide an adequate remedy and when the trial judge has abused his discretion. See generally, Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299 (1962); Wallace v.
Briggs, 348 S.W.2d 523 (1961); Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434
(1959).
42. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White reasons that incriminating evidence produced under the compelling force of a court order cannot
possibly be admitted against the witness in a later criminal prosecution;
compelled self-incrimination is barred from use by the fifth amendment.
Because of this, he argues, an attorney may not properly advise his client to
disobey a court order of this type. 419 U.S. at 473-75.
43. "The constitutional basis for this privilege distinguishes it from other
privileges established by state statute or common law such as those arising
from the relation of priest and penitent, lawyer and client, physician and
patient, and husband and wife. We are not now presented with questions as
to the scope of privileges not found in the Constitution." Id. at 461 n.8.
44. The Supreme Court expressly declined to consider statutory
privileges in the Maness case. See quote in note 43, supra. See also LA. R.S.
15:475 (1950) and LA. CIV. CODE art. 2283 (attorney-client); LA. R.S. 15:476
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Professional guidance as to the scope of these privileges is as
necessary as it is in fifth amendment cases. 45 Since these
privileges are not accorded constitutional status, and since
methods exist by which swift, effective and orderly review
may be obtained, 46 perhaps the public interest in maintaining
an efficiently functioning court system should be sufficient to
limit the extent of advice an attorney may properly give concerning these statutory privileges. Hence, an attorney who in
good faith believes his client has a valid claim of nonconstitutional privilege as an objection to an order to produce
evidence or information should perhaps be obliged to attempt
an invocation of the supervisory jurisdiction of a higher court
to obtain review of the privilege claim before advising his
client to ignore the order. The attorney should exhaust all
available methods of challenging these orders on grounds of
statutory and common law privileges before he counsels his
client to disobey a court's order; by doing so he fulfills both
his ethical obligation to provide zealous representation to his
client and his obligation to respect the court rulings and to
challenge them properly. Failure to seek review within the
legal processes before counselling contempt arguably should
subject the attorney to the contempt sanction along with his
client. 47 When, however, the legal remedies are inefficacious,
as is the case when supervisory relief is denied or when no
stay is granted, counselling contempt may be the only alternative available to an attorney seeking in good faith to protect his client. 48 Holding an attorney in contempt in this latter instance would be inappropriate, amounting to punishing
him for the judicial system's failure to provide adequate
means for enforcing claims of privilege.
Kathleen A. Manning
(1950) and LA. R.S. 13:3734 (Supp. 1968) (doctor-patient); and LA. R.S. 15:461
(1950) (husband-wife) for examples of nonconstitutional privileges.
45. The rationale of the majority in Maness may extend to other constitutional privileges, as when the evidence has been obtained through an
unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment. See
note 43, supra.
46. See text beginning at note 19, supra.
47. 419 U.S. at 459; authorities cited in note 10, 8upra.
48. Contempt is not an effective method of obtaining the review necessary in Louisiana. See explanation in note 36, 8upra.

